Wednesday 2 December MACEDONIA: ORTHODOX, PROTESTANT AND MUSLIM SUFFER AND PERSEVERE UNDER INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS by Janice Broun, Keston News Service Macedonia and its Orthodox Church continue to suffer as a result of controversies about their status. With the break-up of the Ottoman Empire Macedonian territory was partitioned in 1913 between Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece. Serbia got the largest share, claiming Macedonians were South Serbs although their language is more akin to Bulgarian. In 1920 in Serb-dominated Yugoslavia the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) brought under its jurisdiction Macedonia's Orthodox church, which traces its origins (with interruptions due to adverse political circumstances) back to the ancient Patriarchate of OKhrid, which became defunct in 1767. To counteract Serb domination and buttress tepid Macedonian consciousness against Greek and Bulgarian claims, TITO established a Macedonian republic. In 1958 its government encouraged its bishops, unilaterally, to declare autonomy and in 1967 to found an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church (MOC), in the face of SOC disapproval. The SOC questioned its viability but for the sake of its faithful stopped short of excommunication. The MOC, which claims 1,200,000 members, 60- 70 per cent of its population, has ever since been left out in the cold, boycotted by the local Orthodox Churches and bypassed by the WCC, which continues to block its application for membership. In 1991 Macedonia broke away from Yugoslavia without any bloodshed under the astute neo-Communist KIRO GLIGOROV; a decision confirmed by 90 per cent of its two million citizens. It has become a democratic multi- confessional state. It lies at the crossroads of the Balkans, with a multiethnic mix including a quarter Albanian, and it should have been in EC interests to ensure its stability. Now, with the Kosovo border only 20km from Skopje, that is even more crucial. Bulgaria, the first country to recognise Macedonia as a state, has still not recognised it as a nation. Greece, which cannot forget ALEXANDER THE GREAT and denies the existence of its own 200,000 Macedonian minority, claiming copyright of the name Macedonia, was allowed to get away with a trade blockade which brought the fledgling landlocked republic to the verge of collapse. It held out against acknowledging Macedonia until 1995 and then only under the convoluted title of Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Relations with the rump Yugoslavia were normalised in 1996 but relations between the SOC and MOC remain deadlocked. After the MOC rejected a SOC ultimatum in 1994 to return to its bosom, it declared the MOC schismatic in 1995. The usually conciliatory ECUMENICAL PATRIARCH BARTHOLOMAIOS accused it of tearing Orthodoxy apart, dismissing its grounds for autocephaly as �nationalist and political, not ecclesiastical�. There is a fairly small Serbian minority of about 44,000, about whom the SOC claims to be particularly concerned. In June 1997 in a surprise move the SOC Holy Synod appointed their PATRIARCH PAVLE as Church Administrator for Macedonia, and relieved of his duties PAHONIJE GALIC, hitherto the provisional Administrator, because for years his task had been made impossible by the Macedonian authorities' repeated refusal of visas. The SOC complains about its lack of rights; Macedonia is the only country in the world where Serb priests are denied access to their flock, they claim. For his part Gligorov condemns the SOC attitude as �incomprehensible� and a stumbling-block to normal relations between the two countries. Most Macedonians are not hostile towards Serbs in general but are towards SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC. REV BRYAN OWEN was sent to investigate by Lambeth and the Council of Churches for Britain and Ireland in 1995 and this summer, but in a private capacity so as not to offend local Orthodox churches. 85-year- old ARCHBISHOP MIKHAIL OF OKHRID AND MACEDONIA even left his hospital sick bed to spell out his church's plight to him. He reckons SOC opposition stems from ultra-nationalist rather than theological reasons. �Thirty years ago Serb Patriarch Pavle's predecessor GERMAN made the then improbable prophecy that when Macedonia achieved statehood it would get its own church. That promise is forgotten in Belgrade today.� Not all the SOC hierarchy condemn the MOC, Mikhail told Owen. Some, like the eirenic LAVRENTI OF SABAC, are quite sympathetic but �chauvinists� like ARTEMIJE OF PRIZEN in adjacent Kosovo condemn it. The METROPOLITAN OF MONTENEGRO, AMFILOHIJE, interprets Belgrade's stance in yet another way. He regards the MOC schism as due to machinations by atheist communists whose successors carry on just the same policies today. To further complicate MOC problems, the SOC claims ownership of all property built before 1967 - and almost nothing has been built since. Mikhail complained to Owen that the MOC delegation to Istanbul's Ecumenical Patriarchate was not allowed time to air its problems properly; he suspects the SOC of obstruction. He pointed out positive features of religious life in Macedonia. Since 1990 Christians have taken advantage of opportunities for open witness and thousands have come to faith including many former atheists. At Christmas and Easter over 10,000 worshippers pack into Skopje Cathedral. Yet such is the aftermath of the Greek embargo and their government's adherence to sanctions against Serbia that with 40 per cent of Macedonians unemployed and a further 19 per cent unpaid, giving has dropped by 40 per cent in the last year or so. The Church is unable to repair or refurbish its 400 churches or launch soup kitchens or shelters for the homeless; all it can provide the poor now and then is bread and oil. While the Muslims have a new state-of-the-art madrassah, funded by Saudi Arabia, the MOC's theological faculty is shabby, has few books, poor equipment, no residential facilities and no funds. Its appeal to the WCC was turned down. The state of affairs causes Macedonian Orthodox great pain. They stress their adherence to Orthodox canons and dogma. Its council changed its constitution to permit the use of both traditional Church Slavonic and Macedonian and it will probably replace the Julian with the Gregorian calendar. Tensions still exist between those who prefer to maintain links with Belgrade and those who settle for nothing less than autocephaly. Faced by continuing isolation, it is not surprising that the MOC has turned to look for support elsewhere, to other breakaway churches like the Bulgarian Synod under rebel PATRIARCH PIMEN, and the Kiev Patriarchate Ukrainian Church under the dubious FILARET. Even more controversial, even before Macedonia became independent, have been its relations with Rome, the warmest of any Orthodox Church, though the Vatican keeps out of its conflict with the SOC. The Catholic church has provided it with books, moral support and brotherly love. POPE JOHN PAUL's audience with a Macedonian delegation back in 1984 led to SOC accusations that Rome's aim was to create another Eastern-Rite Church, which Mikhail strenously denies. He has met the Pope ten times; Gligorov also met him, in 1995. Then, John Paul stressed the need for different religious groups to cooperate to promote harmony within Macedonian society. At local level relations with 13,000 Catholics (13 priests, 35 sisters and 8 parishes) under BISHOP JOAKIM HERBUT OF SKOPJE AND PRIZREN are good. 8000 Catholics, all Macedonian, are Eastern-Rite; the Latin-Rite Catholics are mainly Croat, Albanian or Polish. 18 boys attend a local minor seminary with a further 12 training for the priesthood abroad. The MOC has built up links with Catholics in Croatia, Austria, Germany and Ireland. Catholic agencies provide relief work; in Strumica sisters work with the Evangelical Methodist Church in Macedonia. This has 5000 members in 11 parishes and works with the disabled, abandoned children and those whose parents are divorced, with sick parents and mental hospital patients. Catholics and Methodists cooperate in the work of the Orthodox-led Macedonian Bible Society. Mikhail also emphasised the Christian clergy's desire for good relations with the Muslim hoxhas. Only the MOC is mentioned in the Constitution referring to the freedom of religion though it is not guaranteed a special status. However, other religious communities charge the government with favouring it. The new Law on Religious Communities and Groups, passed this year, distinguishes between two categories, the first, the �Communities�, are the MOC, Sunni Islam and the Catholic Church (favoured), the rest, the �Groups�, are required to apply for registration and pay fines for violations. The 2000 Evangelicals who have encountered much obstruction and even persecution by local authorities also object to its limiting access to foreign preachers and forbidding alliances between religious groups. They were excluded from commenting on the draft law. The Protestant leaders� statement on 11 January last year drew attention to the fact that the personnel in the government Commission for Relationship with Religious Communities had been inherited from the old Yugoslav communist government, so their hard-line policy was no surprise. The law still imposes restrictions which are unacceptable even to the favoured Communities. These include a ban on profit-making enterprises, the restriction of religious activity to designated locations and a continued ban on religious teaching in state schools. So, over all, as WILLY FAUTRE of Droits de L�Homme sans Frontieres in Brussels points out, the law restricts the right of assocation, the right to evangelise, freedom of worship, the right of self-determination of religious groups and the right to religious education and instruction. Owen, who also has considerable experience working with Albanian relief agencies, is very critical of the Contact Group's failure to meet and consult Kosovo's and Macedonia's religious leaders. �It should be giving every encouragement to moderate leaders who can promote much needed stability within their communities; religion is such a key factor in the Balkans.� He also re-iterate's Mikhail's impassioned plea for proper recognition and for material aid from the other Churches. One positive development has been the recent rapprochement between the Macedonian and Greek governments. In a dramatic volte-face this summer Greek officials somewhat belatedly admitted that they now regard FYROM as the perfect buffer state in the Balkan peninsula. They are obviously terrifed that if the conflict in Kosovo spreads to western Macedonia, whose Albanians now openly support the Kosovo Liberation Army, they could be in danger from a Balkan war. Apparently officials from both governments, anxious not to lose face, secretly long for the UN in New York to impose a solution to the name controversy. Resolution of this problem could also enable the Orthodox world to recognise the MOC's autocephaly and clear the way for the wealthy Greek Orthodox Church to aid its impoverished fellow Christians. Hoxha SULEJMAN REDZEP, president of the Islamic Community, and Hoxha ZEJNULA FAZLIU, coordinator of the Islamic Madrassah and Muslim representative on the Executive Board of the Macedonian Centre for International Cooperation (MCIC), emphasised to Owen their 443,000- strong Sunni community's commitment to pluralism, to a multi- confessional Macedonia and to establishing close relations with mainstream Churches. An interfaith Conference was held in 1996. Though they have benefited financially from the training the Gulf States and Libya provided for their clergy for years, and their generous funding, including a million dollars for their smart new madrassah, they resent being pressurised by them and disassociate themselves from their fundamentalism. In 1995 police raided Saudi relief agencies working with Bosnian refugees and confiscated what they regarded as inflammatory tracts and even, it was alleged, weapons. Like their cousins in Albania and Kosovo, Macedonia's Muslims reflect the tolerance of Balkan Islam which was traditionally multifaceted, sometimes syncretic. As many as 90 per cent practise their faith. They intend to educate a new generation of hoxhas free from Arab indoctrination from the 200 boys in their theological high school. They aim to promote a specifically European form of Islam ready to coexist in mutual respect with Christians, welcoming students from Bosnia, Albania and Turkey. Despite their warm relationship with mainstream church leaders Muslim leaders feel the Slav community ought to try harder to understand their point of view. Widespread prejudice against Muslims, rooted in historical perspectives of Christianity as a bastion defending Europe against Islam, was exploited by Slobodan Milosevic to demonise Albanians, who constitute a quarter of Macedonia's population (the exact proportion is hotly disputed, due to the Albanian boycott of the 1991 Referendum; the 1994 figure of 442,000 is probably 150,000 too low). But since the mid-1990s the dread of another Bosnia has served to increase the determination of the main religious communities to work towards a multiethnic nation. Problems exist through lack of communication, understandable given that most Orthodox are Macedonian Slavs and most Muslims members of minorities with different languages (83 per cent of them Albanians), and that there is no intermarriage. In Skopje Christians and Muslims are becoming more polarised with Slavs concentrated to the north and Muslims to the south of the river Vardar. The main stumbling-block in Macedonia is the deep cleavage between Slavs and Albanians in the western Macedonian towns of Tetovo and Gostivar, where the extreme radical PDPA-NPD Albanian Coalition under ARBEN XHAFFERI is dominant, and where there has been some bloodshed in the past few years. In a worst case scenario of military confrontation in Kosovo, Albanians in Macedonia could be polarised, radicalised and ultimately mobilised and the fragile state could be torn apart. The government has already accepted 80,000 Bosnian refugees and is prepared to accept up to 20,000 Kosovo Albanians but is only too aware how their arrival could destabilise the delicate ethnic balance and the economy. The crucial issue is not religion but Albanian identity. Albanians claim to suffer discrimination because of their nationality, not their faith. They certainly constitute a threat to the moderate Muslim establishment's leadership whose views are reflected in the moderate Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), part of the government coalition. A PDP MP, ESTREF ALIU, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, told Owen that he estimates 90 per cent of Albanians want Macedonia to survive. Basically, they have nowhere else to go. Independent Albania, riven by currency collapse, gunfights and feuds, hardly provides a role model or haven. The Muslim establishment and the PDP support IBRAHIM RUGOVA in Kosovo. All the people interviewed by Owen stressed there could be no independence for Kosovo and that any solution should be within the present internationally agreed borders. The government is anxious to prevent assimilation of the smaller Muslim communities by Albanians. The Muslim community is not homogeneous. The 97,000 Turks, 4.7 per cent of the population, continue to enjoy recognition as a nationality as in communist Yugoslavia, and considerable cultural privileges including schools and media access. The Roma, officially 55,000, 2.73 per cent, feel stigmatised and disadvantaged so many fail to identify themselves and they probably number 200,000; many of them are Christian. The Torbesi, 40,000 Serbo- Croat-speaking Slav Muslims, plus some Bosnian refugees, occupy an uneasy position. The Muslim leaders are extremely concerned that the new Law ON Religious Communities and Religious Groups is too close to the legislation implemented by the former communist regime. Its ban on profit-making enterprises curtails opportunities for religious communities to raise funds. Voluntary funds can be solicited only within mosques and churches. They complain of the lag in property restitution, in which they claim Christians have had precedence. They argue that it is unjust that they are thus prevented from using ground-rents to fund educational projects. They have no funds for the running costs of their new madrassah. Social projects which are desperately needed and could benefit their communities and help promote national stability are also hindered by this legislation. They have even objected to the EC over the new law. (END) Wednesday 2 December BULGARIAN ORTHODOX SCHISM NOT RESOLVED? By Janice Broun, Keston News Service The decisions of the Pan-Orthodox Council which met in Sofia from 30 September to 1 October to resolve the six-year-long schism in the Bulgarian Orthodox Church have not been accepted by all sections of the church or government, according to Keston�s informant in Sofia. The schism originated in May 1992 when the first United Democratic Forces (UDF) government accused PATRIARCH MAKSIM of having collaborated with the communist government, declared his election in 1971 invalid and replaced him and the Holy Synod with a Provisional Synod under METROPOLITAN PIMEN OF NEVROKOP. It is now generally accepted that the main protagonist in the schism, HIEROMONK KHRISTOFOR SUBEV, was a Security agent bent on becoming Patriarch, though his behaviour became progressively more erratic as he denounced the hierarchy on both sides, tried to set up his own church and eventually disappeared to the USA. The leading schismatic metropolitans were just as compromised as Maksim so if (as some people suspect), the schism was a communist plot to destabilise the Church and prevent its recovery, it certainly succeeded. No theological issues were at stake, but property and power were. �The schism is the result of government interference in the Church prior to 1989. The hierarchy were used to having to make compromises and doing what they were told and had problems adjusting to new conditions of freedom and showing initiative. Subev capitalised on these differences and provoked and inflamed the schism�, said Keston�s informant, who had taught Subev in the Theological Academy and suspected him all along of being an agent - as were, he estimated, about half of the students by 1989, as a result of massive infiltration intended to corrupt the Church. The schism dragged on, despite an attempt by ECUMENICAL PATRIARCH BARTHOLOMAIOS to arbitrate in autumn 1993, with Maksim and the Holy Synod standing firm in their refusal to make any concessions to the schismatics. The next government, formed by the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) (the recycled communists), as well as all local Orthodox Churches supported Maksim, who unwisely, according to Keston�s informant, received BSP leader ZHAN VIDENOV before the 1994 elections. The hard core of the UDF electorate continued to back the schism. In 1996 at a National Church Council called by the schismatics, with UDF politicians and representatives of other breakaway Orthodox Churches present, Pimen was elected as patriarch - though with 55 out of 160 electors abstaining from voting. The following summer the Holy Synod held a canonically regular National Council but many of its delegates felt that not all problems of the Church�s past associations with the communist era were addressed. �The special commission on commemorating and rehabilitating Church victims of communism does not seem to have got very far�, complained Keston�s informant, a lay delegate to the Council. �One fellow shouted "The Patriarch has not yet celebrated a single memorial service for the victims of communism."� The BSP government brought the nation to the verge of complete economic and financial collapse. The new UDF government, elected in spring 1997 after a prolonged crisis, at first favoured Pimen but (UDF) PRESIDENT PETAR STOYANOV and some of its members have tried to distance themselves from both parties and leave them to settle their differences without government interference. The Pan-Orthodox Council, convened at Maksim�s request, was chaired by Bartholomaios and attended by patriarchs, metropolitans and archbishops from Russia, Finland, Alexandria, Antioch, Serbia, Romania, Jerusalem, Cyprus, Greece, Albania, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics. Its decisions were arrived at unanimously and seem to have been based on more accommodating recommendations made by the Holy Synod in the late summer. In view of the past intransigence of the schismatics, the council showed remarkable magnanimity in forgiving all its participants, clerical and lay. It reinstated rebel METROPOLITAN KALINIK to his see of Vratsa but split it to create a new diocese centred in Pleven under METROPOLITAN IGNATI who had been elected to replace him. It accepted statements of repentance from Pimen and 12 bishops, and even thought many had been consecrated by the schismatics, nominated them bishops to ancient sees, placing them at the disposal of the Holy Synod. It annulled the anathema and demotion against Pimen but in view of his age (93) did not reinstate him. He was given the title �former Metropolitan of Nevrokop� leaving his replacement, NATANAIL, as metropolitan. Pimen did not attend the Council, allegedly for health reasons. The Council emphasised the duty of the rehabilitated clergy and laity to humbly accept Maksim and his bishops as their canonical pastors, in communion with local Orthodox Churches. It concluded that the schism was at an end. Bartholomaios emphasised that neither side could claim victory or defeat. Only the devil had lost. However, it has not all been plain sailing. Although eight of Pimen�s bishops were made auxiliary metropolitans they did not turn up at the Synod on 7 October to take their letters of appointment, demanding instead �dialogue on an equal footing�. IVAN SUNGARSKY, government chairman of the Parliamentary Commission on Religion, expressed relief that the schism had been overcome but said it would be preferable if Maksim (aged 84) resigned to make way for a younger leader. The truculent director of the Board for Religious Affairs, LYUBOMIR MLADENOV, still insisted Maksim must go. When Maksim returned from Russia with a casket of relics he stressed that he had no intention of resigning. Only one rehabilitated bishop attended the ceremony for the veneration of the relics. The Pan-Orthodox Council�s decisions seemed to have done little to allay the discontent of the parish priests and UDF laypeople. In the spring, some lower clergy decided to take matters into their own hands at grass- roots level and bypass their hierarchy. Many priests go unpaid and are on the breadline. Those in depopulated villages are the hardest hit - priests in big cities can survive on fees from the many parishioners requiring rites of passage. Heated meetings were held in May and June at which difficult questions were asked about their metropolitans� failure to produce proper accounts of diocesan income. Spurred on by ANATOLI BALACHEV and KAMEN BARAKOV of the minority pro-schism Priests� Union, they determined to hold parish elections in October for lay parish delegates - including women - to another National Council on 9-10 November, where they would throw out the patriarch and metropolitans and elect new ones. On 20 October at the pre-Council Assembly they invited all metropolitans and bishops to participate and announce it. Some delegates demanded that the government audit church accounts. Maksim, while admitting that he was not against having another Council in the near future, made his disapproval clear. He says that the newly reintegrated bishops need to work together with the Holy Synod for a while and that unless the National Council acts in accordance with Bulgarian Orthodox Church canons it will be invalid. Keston�s informant�s opinion is that many of the UDF politicians and lay delegates who continue to support the schism are �theologically illiterate� and fail to understand that the episcopate of the Church is far more than an administrative structure. �The majority of committed church members who understand and respect proper church order support Maksim.� He felt that the two priests and probably (former schismatic) BISHOP INNOKENTI OF SOFIA were keeping the schism going; the others seem more willing to cooperate with the Holy Synod now. �The continuing row over Maksim diverts people�s attention from the fact that many of the former nomenklatura and their families have wormed their way into positions of control even within the UDF and democratic organs. There have been worrying trends towards undemocratic practices within the UDF. One member at their recent congress accused them of Blairism! Some people are so busy attacking Maksim they don�t see what is in front of them.� (END)